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Abstract
Global environmental problems such as climate change have both an
international and an intertemporal dimension. Recently, some papers have
used an overlapping generations framework to analyze the climate change
problem taking into account jointly the issues of intergenerational equity
and intertemporal eﬃciency but without considering the international as-
pect of the problem. In this paper, we extend such approach by consid-
ering an overlapping generations model of climate-economy interactions
where the world is split into two regions: North and South. We resort to
numerical simulations of the calibrated model to analyze the eﬀect of coop-
eration over economic and climate variables under two diﬀerent scenarios:
long-lived and short-lived governments. The main aim of our analysis is to
test numerically whether John and Pecchenino’s (1997) theoretical result,
which states that international agreements with transfers that lack an in-
tergenerational perspective could actually harm the environment, applies
to the problem of climate change or not. Numerical results obtained al-
low us to conclude that when we consider short lived governments: (1) the
lack of cooperation always leads to higher environmental degradation, (2)
the higher the welfare weight attached to the North under cooperation,
the lower the environmental degradation in the long run, and (3) some
cooperative scenarios may lead in the short run to higher environmental
degradation than what it would arise in the non cooperative scenario.
JEL classiﬁcation: C70, D62, Q2
Keywords: Climate Change, International Environmental Agreements,
Intergenerational Externalities
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last decade the international community has become increasingly
concerned with the fact that the increased concentration of greenhouse gases
(GHG hereafter) in the atmosphere will cause a global climate change which
might have serious eﬀects on society in the future. In fact, the question is
not whether the Earth’s climate will change, but rather how much climatic
conditions will change, how fast it will occur and how the eﬀects of this change
will be distributed across diﬀerent regions in the world. Most scientists, whilst
recognizing that uncertainties exist, believe that human-induced climate change
is already occurring and that future change is inevitable1.
It has been widely recognized that cooperation among countries to reduce
GHG emissions is necessary to avoid or to mitigate global climate change.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the potential welfare gains that countries can obtain
from cooperation, a binding international agreement on climate change has not
been reached yet. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol represents the only agreement
reached on climate change so far and it has not entered into force because it
is still awaiting ratiﬁcation by many of the 159 countries that adopted it2.I n
Kyoto, countries agreed to emissions reductions targets and methods, but it was
left to subsequent meetings to decide on most of the rules and operational details
that will determine how these cuts will be achieved and how countries’ eﬀorts
will be measured and assessed. Although many countries signed the Protocol,
the majority were waiting for these operational details to be negotiated before
deciding whether or not to ratify the Protocol. Currently, the Protocol only
needs ratiﬁcation by the Russian Federation to enter into force.
Each Conference of the Parties (COP), where decisions are taken about
the implementation of the Protocol, has faced a lot of diﬃculties3.I t i s
1As it is stated in the IPCC reports to the UNFCCC, it is undisputed that the two last
decades have been the warmest for the last 1000 years, sea level is rising, precipitations
patterns are changing, Arctic sea ice is thinning and the frequency and intensity of El-Niño
events appear to be increasing. Moreover, in its Third Assesment Report (2001), the IPCC
estimated that globally average surface temperature would increase in the range of 1.4 to 5.8oC
between 1990 and 2100. Only eight years ago, the IPCC predicted that average temperatures
would, at worst, rise by 3oC.
2The Kyoto Protocol commits 39 advanced industrialized states to cut emissions of fossil
fuel gases by an average of 5.2% of 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. To enter into force,
this Protocol must be ratiﬁed by 55 Parties to the UN climate change treaty, including Annex
I Parties representing at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990. The latest
information concerning negotiations and the status of ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol can
be found in http://unfccc.int.
3At the World Summit for Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002 the
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC noted that: ”In the Convention’s ﬁrst decade, the
centrepiece of global negotiations was to agree on rules for implementation. Our challenge
now is to apply those rules and move climate change to the centre of national policy-making
and action by business and civil society.”
2evident that some of the diﬃculties are due to both the international and the
intergenerational dimension of the problem. Climate change is an international
problem because it will aﬀect all countries of the world, with developing
countries (specially the poor in developing countries) being most vulnerable.
But it is also an intergenerational problem because damage due to climate
change will occur over time aﬀecting not only to present generations but also
to future generations.
The economic literature on climate change has typically adopted the
inﬁnitely-lived agent (ILA) framework to analyze the international and
intertemporal dimension of the problem. However, these models do not always
allow to take into account in a proper way the intergenerational dimension of
the problem. As Schelling (1995) points it out, ILA models rest on strong
assumptions regarding the aggregation of welfare between generations and
world regions4. Some recent studies of climate change have made use of
overlapping generations (OLG) models to study jointly intertemporal eﬃciency
and intergenerational distribution issues. Examples include Ansuategi and
Escapa (2002), Gerlagh and Zwaan (2001b), Gerlagh (2000), Howarth (1996 and
1998) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995). There are also several papers that
compare the results derived from ILA and OLG models used to analyze climate
change. On the one hand, Howarth (2000) and Stephan et al. (1997) show
that, under certain assumptions and parameter values, both types of models
do not diﬀer in their implication for greenhouse policy. On the other hand,
Gerlagh and Zwaan (2001a) show that policy recommendations derived from
O L Gm o d e l sc a np r o v er a t h e rd i ﬀerent from those resulting from conventional
ILA models depending on various assumptions on demographic change and
public institutions designed for the protection of the environment. To be
exact, their model includes demographic change that represents increasing life
expectancy5,s p e c i ﬁes environmental damages as a loss of an environmental
amenity associated to an environmental resource and considers a transfer
mechanism that distributes the value of this resource to consumers.
In the studies mentioned above, the world is described as a single region.
However, in real life, the world is divided into a set of heterogenous countries
each of whom can decide about its own environmental policy. As we have just
mentioned, international cooperation to coordinate those environmental policies
is crucial to tackle the global warming problem. To our knowledge, there is only
one paper (John and Pecchenino 1997) where an international externality is
analyzed taking into account explicitly the intergenerational dimension of such
external eﬀect. In John and Pecchenino’s paper a successive generation model6 is
considered and it is assumed that each region’s government can be either a long-
lived or a short-lived government, depending on the time horizon the government
4An important issue of discussion in these models refers to the discount rate to be used.
A description of the two major approaches used to determine the discount rate for climate
change analysis can be found in IPCC (1995).
5It is modeled as a transition from a lifecycle of two periods to one of three periods.
6I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tan e wg e n e r a t i o ni sb o r na te a c hd a t et in each country and lives for
one period.
3uses to select its optimal policy. They conclude that, although transfers may be
necessary to compensate the developing world, international agreements with
transfers that lack an intergenerational perspective could actually harm the
environment.
In this paper, we use the OLG model with climate-economy interactions
described in Howarth (1998). Since we are interested in the international
dimension of the problem, we have divided the world into two regions, which
will be referred to as North and South. As in John and Pecchenino (1997),
we consider that each region’s government can be either a long-lived or a
short-lived government. Distinguishing long—lived governments from short—lived
governments makes it possible to study the eﬀect of taking into account the
intergenerational dimension of climate change in international agreements.
We assume that taxes are used to internalize all types of externalities
and that both, short-lived and long-lived governments, are able to implement
intergenerational transfers, which are chosen simultaneously with optimal taxes
when the social welfare function is maximized. Besides, we consider the
possibility that each region is willing to make unilateral monetary transfers7 to
the other region. The scenario where long-lived governments act cooperatively
allows us to obtain the intertemporally and internationally eﬃcient taxes on
GHG emissions which are such that marginal cost of GHG emissions abatement
is set equal to the discounted sum of every future beneﬁt.
The main aim of the paper is to check whether international agreements
with transfers that lack an intergenerational perspective could actually increase
global GHG emissions with respect to the non—cooperative solution, as John and
Pecchenino (1997) predicted in a theoretical setting. A priori, this result may
occur in our model because when short-lived governments decide the transfers
from North to South, they do not take into account the eﬀects of these transfers
on future generations. Given that the emission-output ratio is higher in the
South and that transfers imply an increase in the production growth rate of the
South in relation to the non—cooperative solution, cooperation with transfers
could imply a level of GHG emissions higher than that of the non—cooperative
solution.
Simulation exercises are used to compare numerically the evolution of
economic and climate variables on the diﬀerent scenarios considered. The
calibration of the model is based on the scientiﬁc and technological assumptions
of RICE (Nordhaus and Yang 1996) and the speciﬁc parameters for North and
South regions have been taken from Yang (1999).
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 2 presents
7Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997), Germain, Toint, Tulkens and Zeeuw (2003) and
Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) show how international transfers may be used to facilitate
cooperation as they allow to compensate those countries which are worse oﬀ with the
agreement. However, these studies do not consider an overlapping generations framework.
Yang (1999) also analyzes the eﬀects of unilateral transfers from North to South but
in an environmental-economic optimal growth model. In contrast to Yang’s paper, where
government receiving the transfer must use it to purchase technology to reduce GHG emissions,
we assume that the government receiving the monetary transfers uses them to make transfers
to consumers.
4the model. Section 3 describes the command optimum. Section 4 obtains
the market equilibrium. Section 5 combines the results obtain in the previous
two sections to show the required policy intervention in diﬀerent institutional
settings. The model is calibrated in section 6 and numerical results are contained
in section 7.
2 The model
In our model of global climate-economy interactions the world is divided into
two regions: North and South. Each region is assumed to produce a single
commodity which can be used for either consumption or investment. Population
growth and technological change are exogenous, whereas capital accumulation is
determined through optimization of life-cycle saving by individuals. The model
does not consider inter-regional trade in goods or capital nor inter-regional
mobility of labor, but unilateral transfers of output between the North and
the South (θt) are allowed.
The approach taken in the model views the economy in the simplest
overlapping generations framework that assumes that each generation lives only
for two periods. At each date t =0 ,1,...,T and in each region i = North,
South a new generation of ni
t identical individuals is born who lives at dates t
and t +1 . Individuals of generation t will be young in t and old in t +1 .A
typical person born at date t in region i enjoys the consumption levels ci
yt in
youth and ci
ot+1in old age. It is assumed that individuals do not get utility from
leisure and so supply their unit of labor inelastically to the production sector
at each stage of life, earning a real wage of wi
t in youth and wi
t+1in old age.
Besides, each individual receives net income transfers πi
yt and πi
ot+1 from the
regional government at dates t and t +1 8.
Individual preferences are represented by an additive separable utility






ot+1) ρi = 0,u 0(.) > 0,u 00(.) < 0 (1)
where ρi represents individuals’ pure time preference in region i9.
A g e n t sa r eb o r nw i t hn oa s s e t sa n dc h o o s et oe n du pw i t hz e r oa s s e t sw h e n




generates the aggregated capital stock (Ki
t+1 ≡ ni
tki
t+1)t h a ti su s e di nr e g i o n




t) and the residual emissions of GHGs (Ei
t+1)i nr e g i o n
i at time t +1 . The investment in capital of the young in region i at time
8Regional governments use these intergenerational income transfers to release the revenues
raised by a pigovian tax on greenhouse gas emissions and to achieve a desired distribution of
welfare between generations.
9The higher is ρi the higher is the weight attached to increments of consumption in youth
relative to increments of consumption in old age.
5t (ki
t+1) is rented out at an interest rate ri
t+1to the production sector to help
ﬁnancing consumption in old age. Thus, the following equations represent a




















We assume that fi
t(.) is increasing in capital (Ki
t), labor (Ni
t)a n dG H G
emissions (Ei
t) and decreasing in the change of mean global temperature relative
to the preindustrial norm (Tt). The time subscript on the production function
allows for exogenous technological change.
The change of mean global temperature relative to the preindustrial norm
(Tt) is a global public bad that will be determined by the time path of GHG













Thus, current emissions will imply increased future environmental
degradation and hence reduced future output. We will therefore assume that
each regional government taxes GHG emissions at a rate vi
t to account for their
negative impact on production.
Before proceeding with the analysis we require explicit assumptions
regarding governments’ scope and distributional justice criteria. These are
discussed in the next section.
3 The command optimum
3.1 Non—cooperative short—lived governments
We will ﬁrst consider the case of short—lived regional governments (NCSL
governments hereafter) that do not behave cooperatively. We will consider that
the non cooperative situation is represented by the open loop Nash solution
which implies that governments commit themselves to an optimal policy and
cannot react to any deviations from that optimal policy. Therefore, NCSL
government at time t in region i optimizes resource allocation and consumption
6decisions at time t in region i in order to maximize utility of those agents living
at time t in region i and assuming that the government at time t in region j
as well as governments at time l>tin both regions will also follow the same
strategy.
The non—cooperative nature of the government implies that pigovian taxes
will be designed in order to yield a within—regional eﬃcient allocation of
resources. In other words, GHG emissions will be locally priced according
to their marginal impact on the local economy and ignoring their marginal
impact on the rest of the world economy. Note also that, as non—cooperative
governments will think regional instead of global, no inter—regional transfers of
output will take place (θt =0 ).
The short—lived nature of the government implies that pigovian taxes will
be designed in such a way that they will only pursue an eﬃcient allocation
of resources from an intergenerationally limited perspective. This means that,
when determining the optimal price of GHG emissions, all those eﬀects that
outlive the two generations represented by the government will be ignored.
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the government uses net
income transfers to release the revenues raised by the tax on GHG emissions
and to achieve a desired distribution of welfare between generations. We assume








The desired distribution of welfare between young people and old people will



















1+Ri¤−1 represents the weight the government in region i attaches to
the life—cycle utility of a typical young person relative to the life—cycle utility of
a typical old person. The NCSL regional government’s decisions are subject to


































7Equations (8) and (9) characterize consumption possibilities of the economy
in region i at times t and t+1respectively. Equation (10) establishes the impact
of current emissions on future environmental quality.
At each point in time, t, the NCSL government maximizes (7) subject to


















































Equation (11) establishes that aggregated consumption at each date must be
distributed between individuals as to equate the marginal contribution of each
generation’s consumption to perceived social welfare. Equation (12) establishes
that each individual’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution must be set
equal to the gross return on capital investment. Equation (13) establishes that
the marginal cost of GHG emission abatement must be set equal to the marginal
present—value damage that current emissions impose locally in the next period.
3.2 Cooperative short—lived governments
Next we will consider the case of short—lived regional governments that do
behave cooperatively (CSL governments hereafter). The CSL government at
time t optimizes resource allocation and consumption decisions at time t in
order to maximize aggregated utility of those agents living at time t in both
regions and assuming that governments at time l>twill also follow the same
strategy.
The cooperative nature of the government implies that pigovian taxes will
be designed in order to yield a cross—regional eﬃcient allocation of resources. In
other words, GHG emissions will be locally priced according to their marginal
impact on the global economy. Note also that, as cooperative governments will
think global we will relax the assumption that no inter—regional transfers of
output will take place.
The short—lived nature of the government still implies that pigovian taxes
will be designed in such a way that they will only pursue an eﬃcient allocation
of resources from an intergenerationally limited perspective. Thus, as in the
previous scenario, when determining the optimal price of GHG emissions, all
those eﬀects that outlive the two generations represented by the short—lived
governments will be ignored.
8Having speciﬁed two types of transfers, intergenerational transfers and inter—
regional transfers, we need to re—specify regional governments’ balanced budget
conditions. In what follows we will represent variables referring to the South
with an asterisk to distinguish them from variables referring to the North. The
balanced budget conditions of CSL governments are thus the following:







t + θt (15)
We assume that when θt is positive (negative), the South (North) uses net
income transfers to release the revenues raised by both the tax on GHG emissions
and the transfers received from the North (South) and the North (South) uses
the revenues raised by the tax on GHG emissions to make transfers to individuals
in its region and to make transfers to the South (North).
The desired distribution of welfare between young people and old people in
both the North and the South will depend on social preferences agreed by the
two cooperative governments. These social preferences will be captured by the





























where α and (1 − α) represent the weight attached to the local welfare of the
North and the South, respectively.
At each point in time, t, CSL governments maximize (16) subject to diﬀerent





























































































Equations (17) and (18) establish that aggregated consumption in each
region at each date must be distributed between individuals as to equate the
marginal contribution of each generation’s consumption to perceived social
welfare. Equations (19) and (20) establish that in each region each individual’s
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution must be set equal to the gross return
on capital investment. Equation (21) establishes that aggregate consumption
in the world economy at each date must be distributed between individuals
in diﬀerent regions as to equate the marginal contribution of individuals of
diﬀerent regions to perceived social welfare. Equation (22) establishes that
productive capital must be redistributed internationally as to equate the
marginal productivity of capital across regions. Equation (23) establishes that
the marginal cost of GHG emission abatement in each region must be set equal
to the marginal present—value damages that current emissions impose globally
in the next period.
3.3 Cooperative long—lived governments
Finally we will consider the case of long—lived regional governments that do
behave cooperatively (CLL governments hereafter). The CLL government at
time 0 in region i optimizes resource allocation and consumption decisions at
time t ∈ [0,T] in region i in order to maximize aggregated utility of those agents
living at time t ∈ [0,T] in both regions and assuming that the government in
region j 6= i will also follow the same strategy.
The cooperative nature of the government implies that pigovian taxes will
be designed in order to yield a cross—regional eﬃcient allocation of resources
and that inter—regional transfer of output may take place.
The long—lived nature of the government still implies that pigovian taxes
will be designed in such a way that they will pursue a fully eﬃcient allocation of
resources from an intergenerational perspective. When determining the optimal
price of GHG emissions every future impact of emissions will be taken into
account.
We assume that at each point in time the CLL governments face the same
balanced budget conditions that were assumed for CSL governments. With





























At time 0, CLL governments maximize (24) subject to diﬀerent budget
constraints. This maximization problem yields the same ﬁrst order conditions
as those of the short—lived governments except for equation (23), that now it





























Equation (25) establishes that the marginal cost of GHG emission abatement
in each region must be set equal to the present—value of future marginal damage
that current emissions impose globally.
4 The market equilibrium
The previous section provided the social governments’ solution to the optimal
resource allocation problem. In this section we consider the decisions of
consumers and ﬁrms.
The consumers’ problem:
















































































The competitive equilibrium for this economy is completed with the goods
market clearing condition that establishes that the capital stock at time t+1is





5 GHG emission taxes and intergenerational
transfers
In this section we combine the results obtained in sections 3 and 4 to show the
required policy interventions in diﬀerent institutional settings. After comparing
the conditions obtained in the previous two sections, it is clear that the
competitive equilibrium does not in general support an optimal distribution of
welfare. Two types of interventions are required in order to achieve an optimal
distribution of welfare. First, emissions must be properly priced (emission
taxes). Second, income transfers (πi
yt and πi
ot) have to be selected with the
intention of maximizing social welfare.
Emission taxes will vary depending on the international and intertemporal
scope of the regulatory body. NCSL governments will choose emission taxes to
12equate the marginal present—value damage that current emissions impose locally
















This will ensure the equivalence between equations (13) and (32).C S L
governments will choose emission taxes to equate marginal cost of GHG
emissions abatement and the marginal present value damage that current


















This will ensure the equivalence between equations (23) and (32).C L L
governments will choose emission taxes to equate marginal cost of GHG
emissions abatement and the marginal present—value future damage that current























This will ensure the equivalence between equations (25) and (32).
6 Model calibration
To proceed with the analysis we must impose speciﬁc assumptions regarding the
model’s functional forms and parameter values. We calibrate the model based on
the technical constraints of Yang’s (1999) two region version of the RICE model
developed by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). Both models simulate economy—
environment interactions using an ILA framework. The main diﬀerence is that
in Nordhaus and Yang’s RICE model the global economy is divided into six
regions, whereas in Yang’s modiﬁed RICE model these six regions are merged
into two regions: the North and the South. More precisely, in the modiﬁed
RICE model the North represents the USA, Japan and the European Union,
while the South includes the Former Soviet Union, China and the rest of the
world in the original RICE model.
We take the year 2000 as the starting point for our analysis with an initial
global population of 5.88921 billion people, with 0.77521 billion people living
in the North and 5.114 living in the South. According to data taken from the
U.S. Bureau of the Census (http://www.census.gov) people under the age of
thirty—ﬁve account for some 50% in the North and 65% in the South. Based
13on these observations, the number of young people living at each date in each
region can be parameterized in the following manner10:
nyt =0 .42944 − 0.04183(0.21054)t (38)
n∗
yt =4 .29933 − 0.9752(0.68129)t (39)
Equation (38) implies an initial population growth rate of 0.3%/year in
the North with convergence over the long run to a population of 0.8589 billion
people. Equation (39) implies an initial population growth rate of 1.04%/year
in the South with convergence over the long run to a population of 8.589 billion
people. These patterns closely match the aggregate demographic assumptions
contained in Yang’s modiﬁed RICE model.
Following Yang, utility is logarithmic in consumption and we assume that in
each region gross regional output (Y i
t ) is given by a Cobb—Douglas production
function deﬁned over capital (Ki








t is an index of total factor productivity. The input—output elasticities
are based on the assumption that wage income accounts for 75% of gross output
in the global economy. Based on Yang’s baseline model’s estimates for the year
2000, the initial capital stock is set equal to 38.99 trillion dollars in the North
and 15.32 trillion dollars in the South.
The level of GHG emissions that would arise in the absence of pollution
abatement (Ei
ot), measured in billion tons of carbon—equivalent per period, are














Equation (40) implies that the emissions—output coeﬃcient falls at an annual
rate of 1.03% in the North in the year 2000, with convergence to a 49% reduction
of the emissions—output coeﬃcient in the long run. Equation (41) implies that
the emissions—output coeﬃcient falls at an annual rate of 1.14% in the South in
the year 2000, with convergence to a 476% reduction of the emissions—output
coeﬃcient in the long run. These patterns of energy-saving technological change
closely match the numerical content of the modiﬁed RICE model.
10Having assumed that each generation lives for two periods, each period should represent
half of human life—span (' 35 years).



































The ﬁrst term in equation (42) implies an initial rate of exogenous
technological progress of 1.38%/year in the North. This rate falls steadily over
time with a long—run productivity increase of 263% relative to the present. The
ﬁrst term in equation (43) implies an initial rate of exogenous technological
progress of 3.19%/year in the South. This rate falls steadily over time with a
long—run productivity increase of 1507% relative to the present. The patterns
of exogenous technological change closely match the numerical content of the
modiﬁed RICE model.
Following the modiﬁed RICE model, our model assumes that climate—change
damages increase with the square root of the cubic change in mean global
temperature relative to the pre—industrial norm. A temperature increase of
2.5oC causes a 1.155% reduction in gross output in the North and 1.6% reduction
of gross output in the South. This eﬀect is captured in the second term of
equations (42) and (43). The third term in these equations measures the cost
that GHG emissions abatement imposes on economic activity. It can easily be
seen that reducing emissions in the South costs twice as much share of gross
output as reducing emissions in the North.
With regard to the relationship between gross and net output, we keep
the assumption that capital depreciates at 10%/year.T h i s m e a n s t h a t , o v e r
generational time spans, gross capital investment (Ii
t) will be represented using:
Ii
t = Ki
t+1 − (1 − 0.1)35Ki
t (44)
The functional relationship between GHG emissions and environmental












In equation (45) Qt measures the eﬀective stock of carbon dioxide and
CFCs in the atmosphere (measured in billion tons of carbon—equivalent) and Ft
15captures the radiative forcing caused by trace concentrations of methane, nitrous
oxide and water vapor (measured in watts/m2). This variable is exogenously
determined according to a path Howarth approximates using:
Ft =1 .42 − 0.764(0.523)t (46)
The atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide and CFCs is governed by the
following diﬀerence equation:








35 (Qt − 590) (47)
Equation (47) implies that (1) 64% of GHG emissions remain in the
atmosphere at the end of one period and (2) that, over the long run, the
stock of GHGs in excess of the pre—industrial norm (590 billion tons of carbon—
equivalent) is ‘naturally’ removed from the atmosphere at a rate of 0.833%/year.
The initial GHG stock is set at the level reported by Howarth: 784 billion tons
of carbon—equivalent.
Before presenting the results, it is necessary to address four ﬁnal technical
considerations concerning (1) the choice of the pure rates of time preference (ρ
and ρ∗), (2) the choice of the international welfare weights (α), (3) the choice of
the intergenerational discount rates (R and R∗)a n d( 4 )t h ec h o i c eo ft h et i m e
horizon T.
With regard to the pure rates of time preference, we have chosen them to
equate the rates of capital accumulation in the NCSL scenario and the modiﬁed
RICE model. This has led us to consider a pure rate of time preference of
0.5%/year both in the North and in the South.
With regard to the international welfare weight attached to the North, we
have considered several values (ranging from α =0 .2 to α =0 .8)i no r d e rt o
analyze how they aﬀect to the cooperative solution. These diﬀerent welfare
weights may reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of either bargaining power or interregional
altruism of cooperative short lived governments.
With regard to intergenerational discount rates, for the sake of simplicity, we
have decided to start assuming that it is institutionally infeasible to implement
an intergenerational transfers scheme. This implies that, independently
on the rate of intergenerational discount rate chosen by society in each
region, governments will lack the necessary instruments to pursue the desired
distribution of welfare between generations. Thus, not being able to re-allocate
initial endowments, there will be a single ”eﬃcient” allocation of resources
within each region. Intergenerational transfers will be considered in future
development of the analysis.
Finally, with regard to the time horizon, computational diﬃculties have
forced us to consider year 2490 (T = 15) as the ﬁnal year in the analysis.
167 Preliminary results and conclusions
In this session we present the numerical results obtained using both GAMS and
the solver routine of Excel. Figures 1a and 1b show how climate change and
total emissions evolve under the CSL and NCSL scenarios11.T h e n u m b e r i n
















































Figure 1b: GHG Emissions
11So far our analysis focuses on decisions by short-lived governments, since it is in the case
of short-lived governments where we can expect cooperation to harm the environment.
17Several preliminary results follow:
1. The NCSL scenario leads to higher environmental degradation in the long
run than any CSL scenario.
2. The higher the welfare weight attached to the North under cooperation,
the lower environmental degradation in the long run.
3. It may happen that some CSL scenarios lead to higher environmental
degradation in the short-run than the NCSL scenario. In fact, this seems
to be happening when the welfare weight attached to the North is 20%.
Result no 3 is in line with the cautionary note of John and Pecchenino
(1997): “international agreements with transfers that lack an intergenerational
perspective could actually harm the environment”. This result is more clearly
ilustrated in Figures 2a and 2b. The intuition behind our result is the following:
When α =0 .2, given that (1) international agreements capture that the South’s
social welfare has to be weighted four times as much as the social welfare
of the North and (2) the North is initially richer than the South, there are
important transfers of income from North to South. This implies that some
growing potential is transferred from North to South. These transfers imply an
increase in total emissions of GHGs, due to the fact that the South produces




































































Figure 3: Energy-saving technological change
Thus, the exogenous nature of energy-saving technological change is an
important driving force behind our result (see Figure 3). Energy-saving
technological change cannot be estimulated with growth. Consequently,
accelerating the growth in the South may result in greater environmental
degradation unless it is accompanied with higher abatement eﬀort. The
incentives to implement higher abatement eﬀort are clearly weakened by the
short-lived nature of the government.
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